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 Structure, Agency and the Sociology of Education: rescuing
 analytical dualism
 ROBERT WILLMOTT, Department of Sociology, Wanvick University, UK
 ABSTRACT Theorising the interplay of structure and agency is the quintessentialfocus of sociological
 endeavour. This paper aims to be part of that continuing endeavour, arguing for a stratfied social
 ontology, where structure and agency are held to be irreducible to each other and causally efficacious, yet
 necessarily interdependent. It thus aims not to be part of that on-going journey in search of the 'ontological
 holy grail'. Instead, it offers a way of linking structure and agency which enables the practical education
 researcher concretely to examine their relative interplay over time. The methodological key to teasing out
 their relative interplay is held to be analytical dualism. It will be argued that such a methodological device
 is precluded by Giddens' structuration theory.
 Introduction
 At one level, it is a boring truism that sociologists of education are fundamentally
 engaged in the task of theorising, analysing and documenting objective social reality.
 Presumably there are not many who would wish to deny that education sociologists are
 in the job of dealing with matters social-working-class levels of attainment, the impact
 of race ideas upon curriculum content and delivery, issues surrounding teachers'
 professionalism-yet, at another level, what precisely constitutes the social is a hotly
 contested matter. Indeed, for some commentators the 'problem of structure and agency'
 remains firmly on the sociological agenda. As McFadden (1995, p. 295) recently
 observed, '... questions about agency and structure, particularly in education, are
 obviously not going away'. And for Abraham (1994, p. 239), at present there exists no
 practical resolution to the 'problem of structure and agency'. The purpose of this paper,
 however, is to argue that (a) attempts to overcome the structure/agency 'divide' have
 generically been misled by a laudable yet over-hasty concern to avoid charges of
 reification and of philosophical (Cartesian) dualism [1], which in turn has led to (b) a
 denial of social structure as possessing sui generis properties, i.e. emergent properties that
 are irreducible and causally efficacious vis-a-vis agency. Consequently, (c) methodological
 analysis of social reality is precluded, for social reality is unhelpfully held to be a milange
 of individuals and their daily doings-structure is necessarily drawn upon but necessarily
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 6 R. Willmott
 has to be agentially 'instantiated', as Giddens puts it, enabling more than constraining,
 and ultimately inherently transformable at any point in time.
 Concepts of 'instantiation', 'duality of structure' and 'discursive penetration' have an
 immediate and compelling attraction. Indeed, the attraction of structuration theory
 undoubtedly lies in its emphasis upon human agency-upon real flesh-and-blood human
 beings and their actions and accomplishments-rather than Durkheimian social facts or
 Marxist superstructural forces that determine, in puppet-like fashion, working-class kids
 to 'fail' and ever remain 'failures'. Instead of the dualism of mind and body transposed
 to structure and agency, we have the 'duality of structure'-namely one indissoluble
 amalgam. Structure and agency are not separate, disconnected entities like mind and
 body, nor indeed is structure akin to the powers and properties of a magnetic field, for
 how can the forces of nature reasonably be held to be operative in the social realm?
 Giddens is quite right to reject naturalistic analogies: the education system can hardly be
 thought of as a magnetic field, with children and teachers conceived as iron filings
 pushed and shoved by some over-bearing magnetic force (the government, local
 authority ...) or as part of a living system, rather like the body's lungs which provide the
 body (e.g. the over-arching capitalist state) with its life-sustaining prerequisites. Such
 naturalistic or biologistic thinking would now be laughed out of sociological court.
 However, the rejection of naturalistic theorising led Giddens to enter the wrong
 theoretical door. In the sections that follow, it will be argued that another door existed,
 not simply as a convenient fire exit, but one whose key remained in the debilitating grip
 of the Cartesian legacy.
 Structure and Agency: establishing the basis for analytical dualism
 The Cartesian Legacy
 Giddens writes that in structuration theory 'a range of dualisms or oppositions funda-
 mental to other schools of social thought are reconceptualised as dualities. In particular,
 the dualism of the "individual" and "society" is reconceptualised as the duality of agency
 and structure' (1984, p. 162). Indeed, a few years later he remains tenacious in arguing
 that '(s)tructure and action cannot form a dualism, save from the point of view of situated
 actors, because each is constituted by and in a single "realm"-human activity' (1990,
 p. 299). There is one word here that has caused so much conceptual in-fighting and
 disarray, not only among social theorists but indeed among philosophers themselves.
 That word, of course, is dualism. Descartes' dualism of mind and body-of two
 completely separate entities that causally interact-has profoundly influenced work on
 the philosophy of mind. In fact, considerable time has been expended on eschewing his
 absolute division between the two. Yet the concomitant problem is precisely how to avoid
 a complete separation of mind and body without losing their ontological distinctiveness.
 In other words, clearly the two interact and are mutually influential yet are not free-
 floating nor so intertwined that examination of their respective powers and properties
 becomes a priori impossible. It is thus unsurprising that to Shilling:
 Probably the largest obstacle to the integration of macro- and micro-perspectives
 ... is the dominant conceptions of structure and agency in educational research.
 Not only are the respective conceptions of structure and agency found in macro-
 and micro-level work deficient in their own right, they also contribute to an
 unresolved dualism which has characterised the sociology of education. (1992, p. 70; my
 emphasis)
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 Structure, Agency and Sociology of Education 7
 There are two doors available to those who rightly wish to avoid the Cartesian legacy.
 The first door is structuration theory; the other door is analytical dualism (see Archer,
 1982, 1995, 1996; Layder, 1985, 1997; Bhaskar 1993; Willmott, 1997). If one were to
 measure the percentage of those sociologists who have entered the first door, one would
 readily find that the percentage would exceed three-quarters. The problem that has
 bedevilled attempts to link structure and agency/micro and macro/individual and society
 has been the enduring legacy of Cartesian dualism. Thus Giddens rightly berates, inter
 alia, structural Marxism for its conception of structure as wholly independent of agency.
 Here, we witness the Cartesian influence-namely the two separate entities of structure
 and agency. Structure, Giddens rightly argues, is never beyond agential grasp-'out
 there', ever-ready to swallow up agency like a giant societal vacuum cleaner. However,
 as many critics (Archer, 1982, 1995; Thompson, 1989; Layder, 1997; Willmott, 1997)
 have pointed out, his 'duality of structure' provides no methodological springboard from
 which to theorise the relative weightings of structure and agency. This is because the only
 way out of the Cartesian impasse for Giddens was to squash together structure and
 agency into one tightly-constituted amalgam. The problem with this strategy is that it
 leaves the ontological referents of structure and agency (as with mind and body)
 indistinguishable. Ultimately, we are left with an unfortunate but ineluctable conflation
 of structure and agency (Archer, 1995).
 Such conflation is ineluctable since Giddens refuses to take on board an emergentist
 social ontology, where structure is held to be ever dependent upon agency but emergent
 from it, possessing irreducible causal powers and liabilities which differentially condition
 agential courses of action. One needs to return briefly to Descartes to show how one can
 employ analytical dualism to examine the relative interplay of body/agency and
 mind/structure. For Descartes, the mind and body are two separate substances. Logi-
 cally, then, we can never come to an understanding of the genesis of the mind and of
 how the mind and body interact and modify the causal powers and liabilities of each
 other. An emergentist (or stratified) ontology, on the other hand, argues that the
 Cartesian dualism can be resolved by conceptualising the mind as emergent from the
 body-dependent upon, but irreducible to, that from which it emerged. Thus, conceptu-
 alising human agency as a causally and taxonomically irreducible mode of matter is not
 to posit a distinct substance 'mind' endowed with reasons for acting apart from the causal
 network, 'but to credit intentional embodied agency with distinct (emergent) causal
 powersfrom the biological matter out of which agents were formed, on which they are capable of reacting
 back ...' (Bhaskar, 1993, p. 51). Thus, to Bhaskar, it is only
 on such a synchronic emergent causal powers materialism [that] ... we can say
 [contra Cartesian dualism] that it is in virtue of our complex biological
 constitution that human agents have the power they do; while denying, against
 reductionism, that a power can be reduced to its material basis or condition of
 possibility any more than the acceleration of a car is the same as its engine.
 (ibid)
 Contrary to Descartes, then, we are not dealing with an absolute division between mind
 and body-between two distinct substances-but with irreducible strata or levels of
 "reality. One of the enduring fallacies to bedevil social theory has been the misconstrual
 of social structure as a level that is completely divorced from agency--hence the charge
 of reification, for structure is then held to be above-and-beyond agency, something that
 determines us, rather than something which we mould and are moulded by. But it is
 precisely that 'something' which remains frustratingly elusive in Giddens' structuration
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 theory. Such elusiveness is readily attributable to the malign ghost of Descartes and the
 laudable desire to eschew charges of reification. A further, related problem that accounts
 for Giddens' dismissal of any notion of structure as being more than 'rules and resources'
 is the notion of emergence itself. For Giddens, the examples proffered by realists to
 explicate structural emergent properties are untenable, precisely because of their anchor-
 age in the natural sciences. Thus, while he would (presumably) not deny that water is
 irreducible to its constituents of hydrogen and oxygen, he would maintain that social
 structure is peopled and therefore cannot be theorised via chemical analogues. Yet the
 water analogue is invoked simply to show the similarity between the two in terms of their
 causal irreducibility, which exists solely in virtue of internal relations. The intention in
 invoking such entities as water is fundamentally not to anchor social structure in any
 form of natural analogue since, logically, the nature of any analogue precludes exact
 correspondence with its referent. The manifest difference here consists of the human
 constitution of social structure.
 Structure: an emergent stratum of reality
 For Shilling, the very mention of structure qua emergent stratum of social reality would
 no doubt send an immediate frisson down his theoretical back. He maintains that
 (e)ducational research is typically constructed as addressing either large-scale
 structural processes ... or small-scale individual interaction patterns; the
 assumption being that social life itself exists on different levels. As well as being
 a false assumption, since individuals do not occupy different 'levels' of existence
 ... splitting social life into hierarchical levels makes it difficult to conceptualise
 change as a dynamic process involving both structures and human agents.
 (1992, p. 70)
 Shilling is right to insist upon the unhelpfulness of conceptualising social life in terms of
 hierarchical levels, since it necessarily implies the explanatory primacy of structure at the
 expense of human agency: it denies the very possibility of analysing the degrees of
 freedom that differentially-placed agents have within a concrete structural situation.
 However, given the indubitable fact that structure places limits on what teachers can do,
 surely structure has an ontological status apart from that of agency and can thus be
 properly conceptualised as an emergent level or stratum? The problem with Shilling's
 (and indeed Giddens') denial of emergence is that structure is effectively conflated with
 agency (Giddens, 1984); or reduced to agency, granted an epiphenomenal status at best
 (Shilling, 1992). We thus end up with agency being accorded an inordinate degree of
 interpretative freedom and the capacity to effect structural change as and when such
 change is desired. Thus to Shilling, '(c)hange is an ever-present possibility; a view which
 takes us away from deterministic views of the history of education and the education-
 society relationship' (1992, p. 80). Moreover, social positions are held to embody a
 number of expected practices 'which, if carried out by their incumbents, can help
 reproduce the structural principles which characterise a social system' (p. 81).
 Shilling's rejection of determinism has regrettably led to the other, equally untenable
 extreme of voluntarism. If change were an ever-present possibility, then explicating why
 the majority of teachers teach, why the majority of pupils turn up everyday and learn,
 and why the Conservative government was able to steamroller through the National
 Curriculum remains an impossibility. Here we reach Giddens' impasse: on the one hand,
 structure is by its very nature not some separate, naturalistic force propelling agents in
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 their day-to-day social activities; but on the other hand, how do we account for the
 routinised, patterned behaviour that so characterises the education system? The educa-
 tional system contextually limits what can be done, by whom, where and when. One
 particular problem is that Shilling, like Giddens, wants to reconceptualise agency as
 quintessentially being able to 'do otherwise'. But if one accepts, for instance, the obdurate
 reality of those capitalist economies currently afflicted by crisis, then those job-seekers
 who are unable to find a position within the employment structure cannot 'do otherwise'
 (at least within the law, which carries its own constraints). In reconceptualising agency
 as being able to do otherwise, Giddens is effectively making the concept redundant, since
 practical sociology is no longer oriented towards pinpointing possibilities for structural
 change. Again, this is part and parcel of entering the wrong theoretical door, for stringent
 structural conditioning is fundamentally not deterministic, for pupils, like teachers, resist.
 Such resistance, however, carries a structured penalty-for teachers, in the form of
 disciplinary hearings and possible dismissal, and for pupils, the possibility of formal
 expulsion. Such structured penalties inhere within, and are only possible on the basis of,
 social relations (teacher-pupil/headteacher-teacher)-they do not inhere within the
 properties of the individuals concerned.
 Hence, one can talk about the agential 'mediation' of structure because emergent
 structural properties only work through people, not in spite of people (the error of
 reification). For instance, last year I conducted a 5-month period of ethnographic work
 in a junior school that was held to have 'serious deficiencies' by an Office for Standards
 in Education (OFSTED) inspection team (OFSTED, 1996, p. 4). Following the inspec-
 tion, the local education authority (LEA), in conjunction with senior staff, devised an
 Action Plan that was designed to remedy such deficiencies, focusing on pupil differen-
 tiation and ways of improving relatively poor Standard Assessment Task (SAT) scores.
 The LEA advisors completed what was described by staff as an OFSTED-style inspection
 approximately 10 months subsequent to the OFSTED inspection. The OFSTED-style
 inspection was not anticipated by all staff. When I asked the deputy headteacher why she
 did not ask for clarification concerning inaccuracies in the advisors' report presented to
 the school's governing body, she replied that
 We don't actually receive the report. So you can't clarify anything ... [The
 head] and I were given a report to read half an hour before the Governors got
 it ... and we went through it and picked up about 6 different things I disagreed
 with and so did [the head]. And we then said well we want this changed and
 we want this changed. Then they read it to the Governors. The Governors
 then had to give their copies back in, so that these amendments could be made
 umm any that they agreed with so that we could disagree with the facts if they
 were wrong; but we couldn't disagree with any judgements that were made ... (my
 emphasis).
 The reply that neither herself nor the head could disagree with any of the LEA advisors'
 judgements constitutes a stringent constraint. In order to theorise the stringent constraint
 that the head and his deputy came up against, the notion of the ability to do otherwise
 has no explanatory purchase. Of course, the head and his deputy could walk away, but
 this would invoke a structured penalty. To maintain that agents can ever do otherwise
 entails a somewhat dubious psychological assumption, namely that agents will always be
 prepared to incur quite hefty costs, and that structure has no determinate influence-in
 this case, the impediment to challenging advisors' judgements of teaching ability.
 Analytical dualism does not, however, entail an implicit determinism, for both the head
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 and the deputy could exit the concrete structural situation at any point in time were they
 willing to pay the (career) price. But again, this would entail a rather dubious psychology,
 namely that structure does not have the determinacy to supply agents with reasons for
 maintaining, challenging or transforming the status quo.
 Shilling's rejoinder here would be what precisely are the properties that so characterise
 such structured penalties if not 'rules and resources'? He might also be tempted to add
 that 'ontological security' provides the answer to the routinisation of social practices
 (1992, p. 83). This merely begs the question of how one then accounts for the distribution
 of resources in both the education system and society as a whole at any given point in
 time. Indeed, arriving at the workplace everyday because of an in-built need for
 'ontological security' does not account for the prior existence of such structured work
 arrangements! (See Craib (1992) for a critique of Giddens' notion of 'ontological
 security'.) None the less, the principal deficiency with Giddens' equation of structure
 equals 'rules and resources' is the simple fact that such 'rules and resources' are only part
 of the story: they necessarily presuppose social structure. Shilling is too cavalier in his
 dismissal of the oft-repeated criticism that structuration theory is unable to account for
 how certain sets of rules and resources are more enduring than others and why some
 rules are easier to change than others. What is missing from the equation is the fact that
 such rules and resources are intimately implicated in emergent relational properties. The
 'rule' (or obligation) that certain individual actors fulfil the statutory requirements of the
 National Curriculum only makes sense relationally, i.e. such a rule presupposes a teacher,
 a group of pupils, central Government, etc. The requirements and obligations that
 pertain to a particular role necessarily have autonomy from role-incumbents. It is this
 autonomy that validates the notion of structure as irreducible and causally efficacious,
 since it remains despite a turnover of occupants. However, before fleshing out the notion
 of emergence, Giddens' rejection of emergent properties needs to be discussed in order
 to highlight the fact that a stratified social ontology does not entail that emergent,
 causally-efficacious social strata be equated with disconnected Cartesian 'substances'.
 As already mentioned, Giddens' exposition of structuration theory can be a frustrating
 read. There is much in structuration theory with which many sociologists would agree,
 such as the need to avoid reifying structure, reducing subjects to objects of structural
 'forces', denying the agential capacity for 'discursive penetration' of social reality. Indeed,
 Giddens rightly draws upon Durkheim in claiming that societies both pre-exist and
 post-date the lives of the individuals who reproduce them in their activities. Many would
 not dispute that, to paraphrase Marx, we are all born into a socio-cultural context which
 is not of our making. But it is precisely that irreducible enduring something into which
 we are all born that provides us with the warrant to accord structure an ontological
 status, apart from the human agency that created it. The 'duality of structure', however,
 unhelpfully compacts structure and agency into one indistinguishable entity. This is, of
 course, the age-old conundrum that Giddens quite rightly has difficulty in coming to
 terms with; and such difficulty is exacerbated by the lurking ghost of Descartes. Giddens
 is deeply resistant to the notion of 'emergent properties' held to be constitutive of social
 structure. He quotes Durkheim, who remarked that:
 The hardness of bronze lies neither in the copper, nor in the tin, nor in the
 lead which have been used to form it, which are all soft and malleable bodies.
 The hardness arises from the mixing of them. The liquidity of water, its
 sustaining and other properties, are not in the two gases of which it is
 composed, but in the complex substance which they form by coming together.
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 Let us apply this principle to sociology. If, as is granted to us, this synthesis sui
 generis, which constitutes every society, gives rise to new phenomena, different
 from those which occur in consciousness in isolation, one is forced to admit
 that these specific facts reside in the society itself that produced them and not
 in its parts-namely its members. (Giddens, 1984, p. 171)
 Arguably, the key word here, that Giddens would have immediately baulked at, is
 'substance'. In other words, the notion is that social structure is some sort of Cartesian
 'substance', divorced from human agency like tin is from copper. Giddens argues that the
 above quotation has been particularly persuasive but is none the less fundamentally
 flawed, for
 ... human actors, as recognizable 'competent agents', do not exist in separation
 from one another as copper, tin and lead do. They do not come together ex
 nihilo to form a new entity by their fusion or association. Durkheim here
 confuses a hypothetical conception of individuals in a state of nature ... and
 real processes of social reproduction. (1984, pp. 171-172)
 It is worth pausing to examine closely Durkheim's quotation, for the notion of emergent
 properties still confuses some of those who remain committed to Giddens' ontological
 propositions vis-A-vis social reality (see, for example, Manicas, 1997, p. 210). One of the
 initial problems encountered by those predisposed towards Giddens' structuration theory
 is the misplaced assumption that social reality is like natural reality, i.e. self-subsistent, or
 indeed, 'hard' like tin or copper. But this merely brings us back to the age-old
 conundrum of sociology--how to link structure and agency. It is a tempting non sequitur
 to assume that a stratified social ontology entails that structure is somehow self-subsistent,
 ready and waiting 'out there' for us to do as we like with it, but this is not so. Giddens'
 selective focus on copper and tin is instructive; water has powers and properties distinct
 from its constituents, but none the less would not exist without them, despite having
 irreducible properties. This is exactly what an emergentist social ontology entails: the
 necessary interdependence and irreducibility of strata-from the level of agency to the
 level of the school and, ultimately, to the level of the educational system as a whole. Each
 level possesses relative autonomy, whose relative causal efficacy cannot be decided a
 priori.
 A stratified social ontology is readily discernible in the approach of Pollard (1982) to
 classroom coping strategies. Shilling takes Pollard to task for not adhering to the
 conflationary premises of structuration theory (1992, p. 84). Although Pollard writes that
 he aims to produce a model in terms of Giddens' 'duality of structure' (1982, p. 22), his
 opening remark that his intention in focusing on the genesis of classroom coping
 strategies is to link, rather than conflate, macro and micro factors is sufficient to dispel
 any long-lasting attachment to structuration theory. Indeed, Pollard nicely extends
 Hargreaves' (1978) analysis which, Pollard argues, over-accentuates macro factors and
 constraints on teacher action. Instead of viewing structure as above-and-beyond teachers'
 generic control, he sees structure as something which is processually mediated by
 teachers 'on the ground' and thus considers the situationally-specific perspectives, goals
 and interests of actors within schools. His extension of Hargreaves consists of his
 recognition of the school itself as ontologically distinct from the actors who fill its
 positions. Essentially, Pollard provides a more stratified approach, since Hargreaves only
 deals with two irreducible levels of reality--the macro context and what teachers and
 pupils do--whereas Pollard more clearly distinguishes between the macro context
 (education system, Government policy), the school (internal and necessary relations
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 between roles) and the actors who fill the latter positions. Indeed, it is precisely in virtue
 of his adoption of a relational social ontology that Pollard can talk of the vested interests
 of teachers and pupils alike:
 Largely because of their differences in structural position the power resources
 and interests of teachers and children are different in many ways and in a great
 many respects they must be seen as being in conflict. However, a problem
 which they share is that they both have to 'cope with' and accomplish their
 daily classroom lives. (1982, p. 22)
 Pollard's paper on 'coping strategies' highlights the non-puppet-like manner in which
 teachers and children mediate the structural context in which they work. As Pollard
 rightly notes, both have objective interests in carrying out the historically-specific
 requirements of their respective roles. The objective nature of such interests is, to
 reiterate, only possible in virtue of a relational social ontology. A teacher has interests in
 making sure that pupils succeed at SAT examinations, behave well in class, complete
 homework, etc. Such interests not only presuppose pupils but are irreducible to the
 properties of teachers qua individuals. Indubitably individual properties can, and indeed
 do, affect the ways in which teachers personalise their roles-why some teachers are
 fair-minded, funny or downright ogre-like. But role-requirements must none the less be
 met and thus have a relative independence of role-incumbents. The latter would be taken
 by Shilling as redolent of an incipient determinism-that requirements must be met. But
 as I have already indicated, analytical dualism does not entail determinism. The
 structural position of teacher has to be mediated by its incumbent; and the reasons for
 mediating such role-requirements are grounded in both intra- and extra-school inter-
 dependent social relations. In other words, not fulfilling the role-requirements may result
 in dismissal. This, in turn, would render the dismissed teacher ineligible for unemploy-
 ment benefit for a specified period of time. Moreover, the dismissed teacher may be
 unaware of the structured ineligibility of dismissed employees to claim unemployment
 benefit [2]. Thus the nature of, inter alia, the benefits system constitutes a good reason for
 executing one's duties as a teacher.
 Similarly, the analysis by Gillborn (1994) of micro-political struggle evinces the
 necessity of analytical dualism. In this ethnographic case study, Gillborn emphasises the
 utility of ethnography in documenting power: '(e)thnography has a key role to play if we
 are to understand the processes of change and resistance more fully' (1994, p. 162).
 Gillborn does not venture down the Foucauldian 'power-is-everywhere' path and,
 instead, rightly recognises that power is not solely a property of agency but is also a
 property of structure. His account of the way in which a previously 'progressive'
 comprehensive deals with national policy reform explicitly focuses on agential mediation
 of levels of social reality and, indeed, highlights the stringent macro constraints embodied
 in the 1988 Education Reform Act, which played a major role in deciding the fate of the
 establishment of an integrated teaching and planning structure.
 However, the structurationist's rejoinder here would be: how, then, does one account
 for emergent structures being they way they are? This serves only to confuse matters, for
 while it is necessarily contingent that certain social structures exist, such structures are
 grounded in relations of internal necessity. The defining feature of an emergent structural
 property is its internal relationality. This is what Durkheim meant when he compared
 the liquidity of water to society, for the properties and powers of society cannot be
 reduced to individuals; this applies equally to water. We would not explain the power of
 water to extinguish fire by deriving it from the powers of its constituents, for oxygen and
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 hydrogen are highly inflammable (Sayer, 1992, p. 119). Furthermore, the fact that
 structures are the way they are at any given time must not tempt us into futile regression.
 Since structure is relatively enduring and ontologically distinct from agency, it can be
 synchronically dissected. However, for those who accept the indubitable reality of
 structure via the causal criterion but remain uneasy about the notion of ontological
 emergence, of structure as possessing sui generis causal efficacy, it is necessary to exorcise,
 once and for all, the ghost of Descartes. There is no sinister 'substance' pertaining to
 internal social relations. Human agency ever remains the sole efficient cause, but it does
 not follow that structure cannot have relative autonomy and causal efficacy. As Bhaskar
 remarked, the bread and butter of sociology is precisely
 the persistent relations between individuals (and groups), and with the relations
 between these relations (and between such relations and nature and the
 products of such relations). In the simplest case its subject-matter may be
 exemplified by such relations as between capitalist and worker, MP and
 constituent, student and teacher, husband and wife. Such relations are general
 and relatively enduring, but they do not involve collective or mass behaviour
 as such in the way in which a strike or a demonstration does ... (1989,
 pp. 28-29)
 Thus, the individuals who teach, study, clean, repair, etc. in a university reproduce the
 university in their daily actions, yet are causally affected by that which they reproduce.
 Such causality resides in the relations of teacher/pupil, student/lecturer, cleaner/
 cleaning supervisor. These social relations are irreducible, for the powers and properties
 that pertain to individuals qua individuals are modified in fundamental ways. This
 modification arises from the combination of internally necessary relations, i.e. teacher
 presupposes pupil, lecturer presupposes student, governing body presupposes staff and
 students. The day-to-day behaviour of the individuals who fill the latter positions is
 structured in specific ways. A lecturer cannot give himself/herself an honours degree just
 as a student cannot revoke the decision of a degree classification board. Such powers do
 not reside in the properties of individuals qua individuals but in the social relations that
 simultaneously presuppose such individuals for their enduring efficacy. However, this is
 not to suggest that causal modification cannot arise from contingent or external relations.
 The teacher/pupil relation is an internal one precisely because a teacher would not be
 a teacher without the existence of a pupil. Relations may be symmetrically internal
 (bourgeoisie-proletariat); or asymmetrically internal (traffic warden-state); or external
 (passing motorist-police officer) (Bhaskar, 1989, p. 43).
 The existence of equal opportunities officers in both the old and new universities is
 exemplary of an asymmetrical internal relation, for the position of equal opportunities
 officer necessarily presupposes the university-personnel, decision-making executive-
 but not vice versa. However much emergent structural power is 'devolved' to that
 particular role, it does not change the fact that the university's existence qua emergent
 structural entity does not depend upon the latter. This applies equally to the varying
 degrees of power that school governing bodies exercise. It is perfectly possible that
 schools could function effectively without a governing body; but a governing body could
 not function without a school. The analytical rigour that is inherent within an emergen-
 tist ontology is precisely the capacity to pinpoint possibilities for change. Rather
 truistically, there are contextual limits to change, but change is possible depending upon,
 inter alia, the mutability of the extant structure concerned. To take the university equal
 opportunities officer as an example. Hypothetically, a particular university may grant its
 Structure, Agency and Sociology of Education 13
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 officer the power to investigate, in CID-like fashion, all complaints of sexual harassment.
 The officer in question may be asked to investigate a complaint against a lecturer who
 happens to be the person with whom he/she is having a relationship. Given that our
 hypothetical officer has near-untrammelled powers of investigation, it may be that the
 officer decides at the outset to deem the complaint has having no prima facie grounds for
 investigation. Here, we can talk about certain powers being exercised or unexercised, or
 exercised but unperceived. At one level, then, the officer exercised his/her power not to
 investigate, but other powers-such as the power to suspend-remained unexercised.
 Structures continue to exist while their constituents undergo changes in attributes
 which are not relevant to their reproduction. As Sayer points out, 'the landlord-tenant
 structure can survive a continual turnover of members during which their age, race,
 religion, politics, occupations, etc. may change' (1992, p. 94). Here, Sayer is getting at
 the important point that structures can be said to be invariant under certain transforma-
 tions. What he is also getting at is the autonomy of culture (see also Archer, 1995;
 Willmott, 1997). Marriage qua structure is such by virtue of internally-related roles,
 namely those of husband and wife, and is not, contra Juckes & Barresi (1993, p. 204),
 constituted by the marriage certificate! Certainly, other emergent structural entities, such
 as the state and the Church, can combine to confront married couples with objectives
 penalties/inducements in times of considered (or actual) divorce (e.g. 2-year cooling-off
 period before divorce is legally granted). But certificates, ceremonies and 'stag nights' are
 cultural phenomena which serve to buttress marriage: they are contingent and thus
 external (Willmott, 1997, p. 105). The continuing salience of gender within schools
 exemplifies the contingency of culture. Schools, for their existence, do not presuppose
 that boys and girls be treated differently or be held to possess differential levels of
 'intelligence' and subsequently taught on that basis. The fact that pupils and teachers
 alike discriminate in varying and subtle ways enjoins an examination of ontologically-
 distinct levels of reality-namely structure, culture and agency. Teachers, in exercising
 their structural powers to 'push' boys towards certain subjects, often justify their actions
 ideologically. However, the manipulation of ideas is not mere structural window-dressing,
 for the agential take-up of ideas itself predisposes its takers towards specific courses of
 action [3]. As Bates & Peacock (1989) succinctly put it, '(w)e recognise that people who
 occupy positions in the structure of society have personal characteristics such as gender
 and race ... This does not mean that social structure consists of gender or racial
 categories as parts' (p. 575; my emphasis).
 Giddens and Structure: now you see it, now you don't
 The distinctive properties and powers of structure warrants the employment of analytical
 dualism, not Cartesian dualism, for structure presupposes agency for its causal efficacy
 and mediation. Structure and agency do not exist as separate Cartesian 'substances' or
 self-subsistent strata. Quintessentially, therefore, we are dealing with separable, rather
 than separate, levels of social reality. Such separability gets irretrievably lost in Giddens'
 'duality of structure'. At the end of the day, Giddens effectively denies structure an
 ontological status apart from agency. Hence Archer's (1995) ontological arraignment of
 Giddens on the charge of 'central conflation' for the two are held to be inseparable.
 Contrary to Shilling, structuration theory does not 'provide a new way of looking at the
 relationship between social interaction in schools and the reproduction of the major
 structural principles which characterise society' (1992, p. 84). However, in fairness to
 Shilling and others, Giddens' exposition of structuration is riven by contradiction.
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 Occasionally, a sense of ontological depth to social reality is discernible; but ultimately,
 the underlying thread in his texts on structuration theory is the denial of a stratified social
 ontology, thereby precluding the analytical separation of structure and agency.
 To Giddens, '(t)he constitution of agents and structures are not two independently
 given sets of phenomena, a dualism but represent a duality ... Structure is not 'external'
 to individuals: as memory traces, and as instantiated in social practices' ... Structure is
 not to be equated with constraint but is always both constraining and enabling' (1984,
 p. 25). This is congruent with an emergentist ontology. However, the notion of structure
 as always enabling and constraining should start the sociological alarm bells ringing, for
 the emphasis upon the simultaneity of constraint and enablement really amounts to an
 unhelpful and misleading truism. Of course, all structures constrain and enable their
 occupants, but they do so differentially. Some are more enabled than constrained and vice
 versa. Structuration theory is conspicuously silent on this issue. Yet Giddens' whole-
 hearted acceptance of Durkheim's emphasis upon the pre-existence of social forms
 signals the 'externality' of society and, hence, distinctive ontological status of structure.
 Indeed, he writes that '... the constraining elements themselves have to be seen as
 expressing the "givenness" of the social environment of actors to particular agents' (1989,
 p. 258).
 To accede 'givenness' is immediately to embroil oneself in the ontology of emergence,
 because here we have an explicit acknowledgement of pre-existence and relative
 durability: actors confront and reproduce social structure, which continues to exist even
 when such actors have died. This is in contradiction of his famous dictum that 'structure
 is both the medium and the outcome of interaction', since the latter denies pre-existence,
 entailing a vicious circularity for structure is ever the medium and the outcome, never
 a pre-existent given with which agency starts at T1 and either elaborates upon or
 reproduces at T3 (Willmott, 1997, p. 102). The other, equally untenable, way in which
 Giddens effectively disclaims an ontological status for structure is to render it 'virtual'
 until instantiated by agency, but his acknowledgement of the prior existence of social
 forms necessarily entails that structure is real-not 'virtual'-by virtue of its causal
 efficacy, its 'givenness', which we confront either as enablement or constraint but are not
 determined by. Giddens cannot avoid the non-Cartesian dualism of structure and
 agency. This is precisely his problem. He cannot but avoid ontologically distinguishing
 between the two, but wrongly believes that to do so is to be culpable of invoking
 Cartesian dualism; hence his attribution of a 'virtual' status to structure.
 The problem with the concept of instantiation is that it implicitly suspends time.
 Despite his insistence that he is not a methodological individualist, Giddens none the less
 commits the classic error of methodological individualism, i.e. temporal suspension.
 Logically, this should come of no surprise given his tenacious commitment to a depthless
 social ontology. Yet the whole edifice of analytical dualism is due to time; to the fact that
 it is
 because structure and agency are phased over different tracts of time [that we
 are able] to formulate practical social theories in terms of the former being
 prior to the latter, having autonomy from it and exerting a causal influence
 upon it. (Archer, 1996, p. 694)
 It is only by suspending time that Giddens can talk of structure as inherently transform-
 able--never something bequeathed to agency--but always amenable to those present
 here and now. Yet to take on the board the full implications of this would be to deny
 the very possibility of social theory. Pupils, lecturers, teachers, students enter complex
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 educational systems which are anterior; they are the results of complex past interaction.
 Layder has nicely teased out the full implications of 'instantiation':
 In stating that social systems (reproduced relations) only exist in so far as they
 are continually created and recreated in every encounter, Giddens seems to
 be flirting with something of a contradiction; in essence what he is saying is
 that reproduced relations only exist if they are being produced (as well as
 reproduced) at a particular (present) instant, and yet the very notion of
 reproduction implies that a 'product' already exists, such that this product can
 be reproduced in the same form ... An instantiation criterion drains the concept
 of 'reproduction' of meaning. (1985, pp. 143-144)
 The suspension of time is a classic ploy used by methodological individualists. In
 suspending time, one is effectively precluding social thought per se. This may be con-
 strued as conceited nonsense by those sympathetic to structuration theory, but to
 suspend time is to deny the reality of embodied, living human beings who develop
 cognitively, work creatively and even destroy that which secures survival. The real sin of
 methodological individualism is not, as Manicas (1993, p. 223) maintains, its failure to
 'see that the materials with which people work enable and constrain them in profoundly
 different ways', but its denial of pre-existence. Such an a priori denial necessarily entails
 excessive voluntarism: agency ever creates anew and never has to confront or contend
 with pre-existent relations. Yet surely this is logically impossible, since what is being
 created anew? Agents must have reasons for pursuing maintenance or change and such
 reasons must be grounded in something anterior, some antecedently existing state of
 affairs.
 An ineluctable concomitant is Giddens' emphasis upon the intrinsic knowledgeability
 of agency; the fact that agents are not structural 'dopes', that they have the capacity for
 what he terms 'discursive penetration' of social forms. His notion of 'discursive penetra-
 tion' is an important corrective to the extremes of structural Marxism and normative
 functionalism, for actors are knowledgeable in their day-to-day activities. But they are
 not as knowledgeable as Giddens would have us believe. The aim of sociology is to
 provide objective accounts of social reality that can and indeed do conflict with actors'
 accounts-some working-class adults still maintain that they had the same opportunities
 as their middle-class counterparts. Similarly, there still remain sections of the working
 and middle classes that maintain the poverty stricken are so because of their putative
 indolent or scrounging nature. Both accounts are objectively false. Yet even if all of the
 unemployed had full discursive penetration of the capitalist social relations that are
 responsible for their inability to find work, such knowledgeability may be of little import,
 for collective action may not issue in the sorts of structural change that is required to
 provide full employment. Thus the reasons for a lack of structural change enjoins
 examination of the conjunctural factors involved. As Lockwood (1964) found, endemic
 social conflict may not issue in structural change if inter alia high systemic integration
 obtains [4].
 Marxist Educational Theory: maintaining the renaissance
 Analytical dualism both complements and buttresses what Rikowski has termed a
 'mini-renaissance' in Marxist educational theory (1996, p. 435). Rikowski's sophisticated
 attempt to supersede the deterministic formalism of past Marxist approaches to edu-
 cation is explicitly anchored in a relational social ontology. The 'Open Marxism' which
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 he delineates is rooted within 'the methodological approach of form analysis' (p. 441).
 Form-analysis, contra structuration theory, recognises the untenability of conceiving of
 capitalist social relations in terms of 'rules and resources'. Indeed, the irreducibility of
 capitalist social relations, i.e. generative causal tendencies that underlie events, enabled
 Marx to uncover their true nature: to show how capitalist social relations are not natural
 entities beyond human control (the process of reification). Giddens' emphasis upon
 knowledgeability is, clearly, somewhat difficult to reconcile with Marx's analysis of
 capitalist social relations. As Thompson neatly puts it:
 ... it seems unhelpful and misleading to interpret Marx's account of the
 structural relations involved in the capitalist system of production in terms of
 'sets of rules and resources'. The constitution of labour power as a commodity,
 the determination of its value as the labour time socially necessary for its
 production, its exchange on the market under conditions which guarantee that
 it exchanges as its value and yet simultaneously produces a surplus value and
 profit: these features of the capitalist system cannot be treated as so many
 'rules' that workers follow when they turn up at the factory gates, as if every
 worker who accepted a job had an implicit (albeit partial) knowledge of Marx's
 Capital. (1989, pp. 68-69)
 However, Rikowski writes that academic Marxism 'has rejuvenated old debilitating
 dualisms: ... agency/structure' (1996, p. 427). One can assume that the need to eschew
 'debilitating dualisms' stems from its Cartesian association. He argues that '(s)ocial
 phenomena appear to be separate. However, when their internal relations are theorised
 within a conception of the totality then this necessarily involves a critique of their
 apparent separateness' (p. 446). Yet here, Rikowski is arguing for the interdependence of
 levels of analysis, of irreducible social forms, that agency wrongly holds to be indepen-
 dent, rather than carefully eschewing charges of philosophical dualism. Analytical
 dualism equally takes as its fundamental premise the irreducibility of social forms that are
 grounded in internal relations. Rikowski argues that form-analysis 'undercuts and
 dissolves the apparent separations (within bourgeois social theory) of "politics" and
 "economics" ... subject and object, agency and structure and so on' (p. 446). This does
 not undermine analytical dualism, for Rikowski is talking about separateness; analytical
 dualism, on the other hand, is quintessentially concerned with separability. Such
 separability is derived from the distinctive powers and properties that pertain to structure
 and agency, respectively; powers that exist only through the activities of human agency.
 Instead of conflating or dissolving structure and agency, analytical dualism links the two
 by teasing out their respective influences over time. The powers and properties that
 pertain to structure are such in virtue of the internal and necessary relations that
 constitute it. Thus, to Rikowski:
 To speak of money as a form of value, to speak of value as a form of the
 product of labour, to speak of value and money as forms of social relations, is
 to emphasise the internal nature of the relation between value, money, labour,
 social relations. The apparently separate 'things' of society (state, money,
 capital and so on) are social phenomena, forms of social relations, the
 interconnections between which should be understood not as external (causal
 relations, for example), but as internal, as processes of transformation or
 metamorphosis. (ibid)
 Clearly the state, capital, etc. are not 'things' in the Lukicsian sense, i.e. immutable
 features of the natural world, but on the other hand, they are not reducible to agency
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 and, moreover, do have causal efficacy. To maintain that the state is external to
 individuals is neither to accord it Cartesian status nor to reify it. Rikowski is in danger
 of treading the path of conflation, whereby the distinctive properties of the state become
 indistinguishable from those of agency. Externality simply signals its sui generis nature; that
 the state is an historically-changing social form that causally affects those who work
 within and those who work/do not work outside it. Rikowski's (correct) emphasis upon
 the internal relations between labour/capital, etc. is not simply a convenient heuristic
 device. Such relations constitute an irreducible level of social reality whose irreducible
 distinctiveness, as Marx found, provided the very basis for its misidentification.
 Concepts such as the state, labour-power and capital are real abstractions, not
 taxonomic categories, and thus there is no need for Rikowski to place inverted commas
 around the notion of real abstractions (see 1996, p. 445). Marx's theory of value concerns
 generative mechanisms, which are possessed necessarily by capital in virtue of its
 irreducible structure. What Marxist educational theory needs to acknowledge explicitly
 is the importance of contingently-related factors. The historical problem for Marxist
 theory in general has been its reluctance to incorporate contingency; the fact that society
 is an open system. Thus, to take the now-defunct correspondence theory as a case in
 point, the tendencies of capitalist social relations were taken instead to be law-like,
 thereby permitting inter alia determinism to enter via the back-door. Indeed, capitalism,
 as Rikowski argues, requires labour-power, the education of which is not a teleological
 given.
 Concluding Remarks: the need for analytical dualism
 Giddens' structuration theory exemplifies the continuing stranglehold of Cartesian
 dualism on social theory. The attraction of Giddens' 'duality of structure' lies in its
 rejection of structure and agency as Cartesian entities-i.e. entities totally divorced from
 each other-and in its repositioning of human agency at the forefront of sociological
 analysis. 'Au revoir' determined puppets of reified structural forces; 'bonjour' knowledge-
 able and creative agency. Giddens' work is clearly much more sophisticated than
 this-yet, of course, this paper can hardly do justice to the complexity and erudition of
 his multiplicitous oeuvres. However, as the foregoing indicates, there are some intrac-
 table problems and contradictions that vitiate his overall enterprise. Despite talk of the
 system as possessing 'structural properties', Giddens still refuses to countenance the latter
 as possessing sui generis properties and powers. This is attributable to both the enduring
 legacy of Descartes and the understandable worry that 'emergent properties' are only
 applicable in the natural world, not the social one.
 Yet ontological emergence is not solely applicable to the natural world. What has
 confused the issue is exactly the notion that the social world is like the natural world, that
 society is somehow like a magnetic field. Society is simply society. Thus, to Manicas:
 Still, since the reality of structure is activity-dependent, social structures
 have no causal power-unlike a magnetic field, e.g. which does. Put in other
 terms, social structures have effects only insofar as they are incarnate in the
 activities of persons, for example, insofar as Charlie behaves like our theoretical
 bureaucrat. (1997, p. 199)
 There is a contradiction here: Manicas rightly argues that social structure is not like a
 magnetic field, yet he argues that social structure has effects, effects which are only
 possible through agential activity, but denies structure any causal efficacy. Without the
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 notion of structure as pre-existent, irreducible and causally efficacious, one cannot
 explain why Charlie behaves like a bureaucrat. At the beginning of the article from
 which this quotation is taken, Manicas writes that he hopes that he does not fall into the
 methodological individualist trap (1997, p. 194). Unfortunately this is the only option left
 to him. This applies equally to Giddens: both Manicas and Giddens, on the one hand,
 accept the effects of social structure (thereby establishing its reality), yet renege because
 of the misassumption that structure qua emergent stratum entails the error of reification.
 Hence Manicas's emphasis upon structure's effects being incarnate only in the activities
 of people. Analytical dualism does not deny that structure exists only through the
 activities of people: it simply accords structure-relative autonomy in order to explain such
 activities. Bureaucracies, schools and universities are emergent relational entities and
 therefore exist at a different level from that of human agency. Shilling is right to argue
 that individuals do not occupy different levels of existence, for this implies that human
 agency is like a compact disc, i.e. slotted into one 'level' of the hi-fi system, unable to
 affect that which controls it-simply there to be played. A stratified approach to structure
 and agency, however, does not entail this, for each mutually influences the other and
 presupposes the other. Hence the possibility of analytical dualism to examine their
 relative efficacy over time.
 Indeed, Giddens' reformulation of structure qua 'rules and resources' is inadequate for
 the very fact that it refuses to incorporate that which it effectively defines out of existence,
 namely the anterior irreducibility and causal efficacy of social forms. Thus, if one were
 to accept Shilling's claim that structuration theory provides a useful way out of the
 Cartesian impasse, then practical sociology would be somewhat hard pressed to find any
 propositions to aid methodological analysis of structure at any given point in time.
 Structuration theory does not accord structural power relatively independent causal
 properties. The fact that structural power depends on agency for its causal efficacy, that
 it necessarily has to be mediated by agency, does not negate this. At best, we are enjoined
 to examine the multiplicity of 'rules and resources' without asking questions of prove-
 nance, how things change, why they stay the same. Analytical dualism, in contradistinc-
 tion, recognises the stratified nature of social reality, permitting analysis of socio-cultural
 change at any level.
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 NOTES
 [1] As Hacker notes:
 The thought that a human being is a composite creature consisting of body and soul (or
 mind, or spirit) is an ancient one ... This conception ... was articulated in the religious and
 philosophical thought of antiquity and the Middle Ages. It was given its most powerful
 philosophical expression in our era by Descartes. According to Descartes, a human being is
 composed of two distinct substances, the mind and the body. A person's innermost self, that
 in which his (sic) essential identity consists, and that to which he refers when he uses the
 first-person pronoun 'I', is his mind or soul, the res cogitans. The essence of the mind is thought,
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 the essence of the body extension. A person is an embodied anima, for while the body is
 destructible, the mind or soul is not. (1997, p. 14)
 Thus, those theorists who openly adopt a 'dualist' approach to social reality are understandably held to
 be culpable of reifying society, since society is taken to be like Descartes' body, disconnected from agency
 and unnecessary for its existence. This paper, however, maintains that an analytically-dualist approach
 does not entail reification, for it is recognised that structure, unlike mind, is dependent upon agency but
 none the less has relatively autonomous powers and properties. Furthermore, it is therefore unsurprising
 that the notion of society or structure as possessing sui generis properties was (wrongly) assumed to entail
 reification, that such properties are disconnected supra-human 'substances'. However, as Archer points
 out:
 Literally, the phrase [sui generis] means nothing more than 'of its own kind' ... The confusion
 arises etymologically because the same word genus (of which generis is the genitive) means
 'birth', deriving from the older Sanskrit verb 'jan', meaning 'to be begat'. Hence the source
 of the Holistic error that (reified) Society begets or generates is own (equally reified) properties.
 However, when referring to things, such as 'society', it denotes merely 'sort' or 'kind'. (1995,
 pp. 48-49)
 [2] As Abraham argues, '... actors may miscalculate, or be oblivious of, the workings of certain aspects of
 society, including their own interests' (1994, p. 237). Indeed, to establish real vested interests does not
 entail that beneficiaries automatically become aware of the need for continued maintenance and of their
 ideological import. However, reality often plays a helping hand in reminding beneficiaries of their
 rewarding situation!
 [3] Culture itself has emergent relational properties that predispose agency towards specific courses of action.
 See Archer (1995, chapter 7), 'Structural and cultural conditioning', for an account of the four 'situational
 logics' that actors embroil themselves in when they uphold certain propositions.
 [4] As Archer (1995) has pointed out, Lockwood's principal concern was to reject the methodological
 individualism intrinsic to conflict theory and to explain why low social integration per se is not a sufficient
 basis on which to account for change: it had to be complemented by an analysis of system integration.
 Thus, to Lockwood, '... conflict may be both endemic and intense in a social system without causing any
 basic structural change ... Conflict theory would have to answer that this is decided by the variable factors
 affecting the power balance between groups ... What is missing is the system integration focus ...' (1964,
 p. 249). Essentially, social integration refers to the orderly or conflictual relations between actors; system
 integration refers to the orderly or conflictual relations between the parts (emergent relational properties)
 of society. The practical social theorist can theorise about the various conjunctions between the social and
 the systemic (between 'the people' and 'the parts') on a multi-level basis. For instance, at the level of roles,
 i.e. with the difference between roles and their occupants.
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